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Case No. 17082

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
POINT I.
THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISIONS DO
NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF THE INTRA-FAMILY
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN A CASE INVOLVING
NEGLIGENCE.
In Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (1980), the Utah
Supreme Court abrogated intra-spousal immunity for intentional
torts.

In Stoker, the wife, after obtaining a divorce, brought

suit against her former husband for intentionally inflicted torts
committed during their marriage.

The lower court dismissed the

action based on intra-spousal immunity.

The Utah Supreme Court

reversed and held that §30-2-4 of the Utah Married Women's Act,
Utah Code Ann., authorized a married woman to "prosecute and
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defend all actions for the preservation and protection of her
• •

• right to be free of an intentional tort of her husband."

Id. at 5.

The court reasoned that the main objective of the Utah

Married Women's Act was to eliminate all of the disabilities
imposed on married women under the common law unity theory.
Therefore, the common law intra-spousal immunity was in direct
opposition to the statute.
Although one can argue persuasively that the Utah
Married Women's Act as found in §30-2-4, U.C.A.

(1953), does not

really create a right in the wife to sue her husband in tort or
vice versa, in the Stoker setting, however, abrogation of intraspousal immunity is undoubtedly reasonable.

The policy most fre-

quently invoked for retaining the immunity is the preservation of
domestic tranquility and family solidarity.

In the case of

intentional torts, however, the argument does not make as much
sense because the tranquility has already been shattered by the
tortfeasor's spouse.

The argument is especially weak in Stoker

because the marriage sought to be preserved had already been
dissolved at the time of the suit.
The recent decision of Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d
37 (1980), also bears upon the present problem.

In Elkington,

the defendant, in a jdry trial, was found guilty of "sexually
assaulting and abusing his adopted daughter."

Id. at 38.

The

defendant claimed error because the trial court refused to
instruct the jury that consent of the daughter constituted a
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defense, and because punitive damages awarded by the jury were
excessive, and defendant also raised the defense of intra-family
immunity.
The Supreme court summarily dismissed defendant's intrafamily immunity argument by noting that intra-family immunity is
an affirmative defense which defendant failed to plead at his
earlier trial.

However, the court went on to say:
There is a clear majority trend toward
limiting or abolishing the immunity which
the common law conferred on parents as to
actions brought by their children. We
think it is sufficient here to say that
there is no foundation in.our own law,
statutory or decisional, upon which to
base parental immunity against a suit
such as the instant one; and we don't
think there should be. Id. at 40.
(Citations omitted, emphasis added)

Thus, the court notes that the trend is either toward limiting or
abolishing intra-family immunity.

In the context of intentional

sexual abuse, the court finds the invocation of the intra-family
immunity doctrine particularly objectionable.
There are, however, many situations in which intrafamily immunity would serve the purposes for which it was originally promulgated.

These purposes include danger of fraud or

collusion, and preservation of family tranquility and parental
discipline.

For example, where a child is accidentally injured

when he picks up a sharp object that his mother had been using,
it is clear that family tranquilty and parental discipline will
be diminished, if not destroyed, if the child were to sub-
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sequently sue his mother.

Family tranquility would also be

destroyed if a parent were allowed to sue his child for injuries
sustained when the parent stepped on the child's roller skate
left on the front porch stairs.

Many other situations could be

imagined where a suit between a parent and child is to be
discouraged.

There is a tremendous difference between injuries

negligently inflicted, wherein family tranquilty and parental
discipline has not been affected, and injuries intentionally
inflicted, wherein family tranquility and parental discipline has
effectively been destroyed.
Thus in the present case, where the damage sustained by
the plaintiff was negligently inflicted by the plaintiff's minor
daughter, this court should recognize the intra-family immunity
doctrine and refuse to allow such a suit.

The present case is

easily distinguishable from Elkington and in view of the unintentional nature of the injury here, it is clear that family
tranquility could be disturbed by such a suit.

Therefore,

although this court has refused to recognize intra-family
immunity as a defense to an intentionally inflicted tort, there
is a need for such an immunity in the context of negligently
inflicted injuries.

The trial court's action in granting a

judgment in contribution against third-party defendant Genice Gay
Bishop should be reversed.

-4-
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POINT II.
THE FACT THAT A PARTY IS COVERED BY
INSURANCE IS IMMATERIAL AND OTHERWISE
INADMISSIBLE.
Defendant states in his brief that the real party in
interest in this case is the insurance company, not Genice
Bishop, Charles Nielsen or George Bishop.

Thus, defendant

no t es '' • • • the suit here does not bog itself down on an interfamily (sic) immunity problem, but it is an inter-family
(sic)insurance company • • • problem." (Respondent's brief, p. 3)
The fact that the parties injured are covered by insurance,
however, is not a matter to be considered in this case.
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that:
Evidence that a person was, at the time a
harm was suffered by another, insured
wholly or partially against loss arising
from liability for that harm is inadmissible as tending to prove negligence
or other wrongdoing.
In Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121
(1965), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the general rule:
That the question of insurance is
immaterial and should not be injected
into the trial; and that it is the duty
of both counsel and the court to guard
against it. Id. at 123.
The Utah Supreme Court reasserted that position recently in Tjas
v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (1979).

Consequently third-party defen-

dant objects to any reference in this case to the fact of
insurance coverage.
Further, the Utah Supreme Court in Rubalcava v.
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Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), emphasized the
immateriality of insurance coverage in the context of an intraspousal immunity defense, except as to demonstrate a further need
for the defendant to protect against collusion.

The court

stated:
The answer to the argument for marital
harmony:
that discord will not be engendered when the insurance company is to
pay, is neither sound nor entirely
realistic. The question of liability can
be ascertained justly only upon its own
merits. Whether there is insurance or
not is immaterial to this determination.
However, the fact cannot be ignored that
where there is insurance, and this is
known to both parties, the temptation to
collusion exists; and this is increased
when the supposedly adverse parties are
in the symbiotic relationship of husband
and wife.
(Emphasis added)
384 P.2d at
391.
It should also be noted that there are many instances in
which intra-family immunity may be at issue and the parties would
not be covered by insurance.

Hence insurance coverage cannot be

a reason for abrogation of intra-family immunity in a neglgience
setting.

Thus, the respondent's argument that this is an intra-

family insurance problem rather than intra-family immunity
problem is not a proper argument.

Respectfully submitted this

,,Z::~ay

of March, 1981.

::R;;-~L:
~~illiams

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
and Third-Party Defendant-Appellant
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